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Abstract – Sensor networks technologies had proved their 
great practicability in the real world, being just a matter 
of time until this kind of networks will be standardized 
and used in the field. This paper presents a new approach 
to secure the transmission of information in sensor 
networks and is based on a combined hardware-software 
architecture using three components: a) a mechanism to 
provide sensor authentication and secret key distribution;  
b) AES symmetrical encryption algorithm with 
predistributed keys; and c) an attack detection stratagem 
using an expert system based on the prediction of the 
values provided by the sensors, followed by reducing the 
sensor trust coefficient. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Wireless sensor networks are one of the most quickly 
developing domains that are using wireless 
communications, providing a seamless connection between 
the physical world and the global information 
infrastructure. This connection is established via a dense 
deployment of inexpensive, tiny sensing devices sometimes 
in resource-limited and hostile environments such as 
disaster areas, seismic zones, ecological contamination 
sites, military combat zones, etc. Their deployment in such 
harsh environments can be dangerously disturbed by any 
kind of sensor malfunction or, more damaging, by 
malicious attacks from an adversary. In this research area, 
it is crucial the development of new architectures/security 
systems that achieve protection by encrypting the 
transmissions, as well as protection against physical attacks 
on sensors (sensor capturing) or against attacks performed 
due to insecure routing protocols. 
 
The design and deployment of wireless sensor networks 
faces some major challenges nowadays because of severe 
constraints which oftentimes conflict with each other, like: 
a) sensor nodes have restrictive power consumption, 
bandwidth radio transmission, computational capacity and 
memory; b) sensor nodes are prone to failure or malicious 
attacks; and, c) the aggregated sensing information 
provided by the sensor network must have the following 
attributes: accuracy, security, availability. One important 
challenge that researchers have to face is information 
security in wireless sensor networks. Even more 
protocols/strategies had been proposed, none can be used 
as a standard and none can guaranty a very good security. 
The motes being deployed in a certain environment without 
any previous network setup should be able to communicate 
secure and be able to avoid intruders. For this reason 
cryptographic algorithms should be helpful, but 
unfortunately not enough for the moment. The sensor 
network designer should decide on more security implying 
high power consumption and less security with low power 
consumption. For example, in wireless sensor networks 
used for detection (fire, flood, object movement, etc.) the 
information validity should be no more than few seconds, 
enough to be propagated to the sink (the sink of a wireless 
sensor network is a device that reports gathered 
information to monitoring groups or fire an alarm). In this 
situation, on one hand, the level of information security is 
not very high, and could be used symmetric cryptographic 
algorithms or asymmetric algorithms with shorter key 
length, but on the other hand, authentication should be very 
important in order to minimize the possibility of an attacker 
to send wrong information. 
 
After studying the most important attacks in sensor 
networks, we considered a security scheme based on the 
use of three pillars: one-time authentication of sensors done 
just after their deployment in the field; symmetric 
cryptography, with pre-distributed keys for the 
communications inside sensor network; a knowledge based 
system (KBS) developed for discovering and treating the 
attacks in sensor networks or the sensor malfunctions. This 
paper will present our approach upon such a KBS and the 
related security method. 
 
II ATTACKS IN SENSOR NETWORKS  
 
Sensor networks due to their restrictive constraints are 
vulnerable to some relevant types of attacks that cannot be 
avoided only by cryptography: eavesdropping, traffic 
analysis, spoofing, selective forwarding, sinkhole attack, 
wormhole attack, Sybil attack, Hello flood attack and node 
capture attack are the most important [1].  
 18 
A. Eavesdropping 
 
Because of the nature of the carrying medium (broadcast) 
in wireless sensor networks, an attacker using a high-
quality receiver could simply listen to data and control 
traffic. The adversary would be capable to retrieve 
information like location of node, Message IDs, Node IDs, 
timestamps, application specific information, etc. Strong 
encryption techniques should be used to counter 
eavesdropping. 
 
B. Traffic analysis 
 
Traffic analysis is based on intercepting and inspecting 
messages in order to obtain information from patterns. It 
can be performed even when the messages are encrypted 
and cannot be decrypted. For example, a boost in the 
number of transmitted packets between certain nodes could 
signal that a specific sensor has registered activity. 
 
C. Spoofed, altered, or replayed routing information 
 
The most direct attack against a routing protocol is to target 
the routing information exchanged between nodes. By 
spoofing, altering, or replaying routing information, 
adversaries may be able to create routing loops, attract or 
repel network traffic, extend or shorten source routes, 
generate false error messages, partition the network, 
increase end-to-end latency, etc. 
 
D. Selective forwarding 
 
Selective forwarding is a subtle attack in which malicious 
nodes correctly forward most of the messages and 
selectively, silently and intentionally drop other messages 
which are not propagated any further. 
 
E. Sinkhole attack 
 
In a sinkhole attack, an adversary is making a malicious 
node to look especially attractive for the surrounding 
nodes, for example by claiming a short or a fast route to the 
destination with respect to the routing metric or by making 
the malicious node look like a base station. By this, the 
attacker can create a sphere of influence and lure nearly all 
the traffic from that particular area through this sinkhole 
node. 
 
F. Sybil attack 
 
In a Sybil attack, a single node illegitimately claims 
multiple identities to other nodes in the network. 
 
G. Wormholes 
 
In the wormhole attack, an adversary makes a tunnel 
between two malicious nodes: one node records packets in 
one location and sends this information through a low-
latency link to another malicious node far away, which 
replays it locally. This tunneling enables the tunneled 
packet to arrive sooner by using fewer hops than if the 
packet traversed a normal path. 
 
H. Hello flood atack 
 
In order to announce themselves to their neighbors, in 
many protocols, a HELLO message is required to be 
broadcasted. By this, an attacker using a powerful radio 
transmitter sends such HELLO messages to the entire 
network convincing a large majority of nodes to consider 
the malicious node as neighbor even if it is probably out of 
range. The network is left in a state of confusion. 
 
I. Acknowledgement spoofing 
 
If a protocol uses implicit or explicit link-layer 
acknowledgements, these acknowledgements can be 
forged, so that other nodes believe a weak link to be strong 
or disabled nodes alive. 
 
J. Node capture 
 
Probably the biggest threat for a wireless sensor networks 
is node capturing attack where an adversary gains full 
control over sensor nodes through direct physical access 
[2]. This type of attack is fundamentally different from the 
attacks already presented because it doesn’t rely on security 
holes in protocols, broadcasting, operating systems, etc. It 
is based on the geographic deployment of the sensor nodes 
in the field. Realistically, we cannot expect to control 
access to hundreds of nodes spread over several kilometers 
and, by this, we make a node capturing attack being very 
possible. An attacker can damage or replace sensor and 
computation hardware or extract sensitive material such as 
cryptographic keys to gain unrestricted access to higher 
levels of communication. Moreover, all sensors are usually 
assumed to run the same software, in particular, the same 
operating system. By finding an appropriate bug in the 
sensor network, through reverse engineering techniques 
applied to captured sensor, allows the adversary to control 
the entire sensor network. 
 
Our proposed security architecture was developed to 
provide efficient countermeasures for the types of attacks 
presented bellow. Moreover this architecture was meant to 
be a realistic approach by taking into considerations the 
severe constraints that characterize sensor nodes. 
 
III. SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR SENSOR 
NETWORKS 
 
A. Sensor Network Model 
 
a) We assume a static sensor network, i.e., sensor 
nodes are not mobile. Each sensor node knows its own 
location [3] even if they were deployed via aerial scattering 
or by physical installation.  If not, the nodes can obtain 
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their own location through location process described in 
[4].  
b) The sensor nodes are similar in their 
computational and communication capabilities and power 
resources to the current generation sensor nodes, e.g. the 
Berkeley MICA2 motes. We assume that every node has 
space for storing up to hundreds of bytes of keying 
materials.  
c) The base station also called access point, acting as 
a controller and as a key server, is assumed to be a laptop 
class device and supplied with long-lasting power. We also, 
assume that the base station will not be compromised. 
d) We rely on wireless cellular network (WCN) 
architecture [5]. In this architecture, a number of base 
stations are already deployed within the field. Each base 
station forms a cell around itself that covers part of the 
area. Mobile wireless nodes and other appliances can 
communicate wirelessly, as long as they are at least within 
the area covered by one cell. 
e) Also, it it possible to extend our methodology to a 
SENMA (SEnsor Network with Mobile Access) 
architecture that was proposed in [6] for large scale sensor 
networks. The main difference related to the cellular 
network architecture is that base stations are considered to 
be mobile, so each cell has varying boundaries which 
implies that mobile wireless nodes and other appliances can 
communicate wirelessly, as long as they are at least within 
the area covered by the range of the mobile access point. 
f) We are also assuming that an event can be 
detected by multiple sensors nodes situated in the 
surrounding area, so we rely on the redundancy of sensor 
networks. 
 
The two types of architectures presented bellow (WCN and 
SENMA) have important properties that will be considered 
for developing a secure sensor network: nodes talk directly 
to base stations; no node-to-node communications; no 
multi-hop data transfer.; sensor synchronism is not 
necessary; sensor do not listen, only transmit and only 
when polled for; complicated protocols avoided; reliability 
of individual sensors much less critical; system 
reconfiguration for mobile nodes not necessary. 
 
B. First Pillar: Sensor Authentication and Key 
Predistribution 
 
Sensor authentication and key establishment in sensor 
networks are delicate issues since asymmetric key 
cryptography is inappropriate for use in resource 
constrained sensors. In order to solve this problem we 
chose the random-pairwise keys scheme presented in [7], 
which perfectly preserves the secrecy of the rest of the 
network when any node is captured, and also enables node-
to-node authentication and quorum-based revocation. 
 
C. Second Pillar: Symmetric Encryption 
 
We surveyed some block ciphers to find one that is well-
suited for sensor networks. Even if RC5 and Skipjack 
algorithms seemed to be most appropriate for software 
implementation on embedded microcontrollers [8], we 
found that AES can also be implemented efficiently, with 
performance not much worse than RC5 and Skipjack [9]. 
We consider that AES is a perfectly suitable block cipher 
for sensor networks although it has a small disadvantage in 
the fact that its block length is longer. 
 
D. Third Pillar: Detecting Attacks in Sensor Networks By 
Using a Knowledge Based System 
 
Detecting anomalies and intruders in sensor networks 
is very important.  After detection, the sensor network can 
take decisions to investigate, find and remove malicious 
nodes if possible. In order to solve the problem of attacks 
detection, we rely on one important natural feature of 
sensor networks that is inherent redundancy. New 
approaches for ensuring security and power savings in 
sensor networks are based on this characteristic. It is 
known that redundancy in sensor networks can provide 
higher monitoring quality [10][11], by exploiting the 
adjacent nodes to discern the rightness of local data. These 
highly localized results can be aggregated by methods such 
as [12][13] to provide higher data reliability to requesting 
applications such as event/target detection [12][14][15]. 
Here, we will take a step forward connected to this 
approach: we will use redundancy as a feature that can 
bring a higher level of information security in sensor 
network. 
 
There are two possible approaches: hardware redundancy 
and analytical redundancy. Hardware redundancy 
implicates the use of supplementary sensors (in normal 
circumstances they are already deployed in the field due to 
the necessity of covering the area in case of malfunctioning 
of some sensor nodes) and selection of data that appears 
similarly on the majority of sensors. Analytical redundancy 
is done through a process of comparison between the actual 
sensor value and the expected/estimated sensor value. This 
approach is based on a mathematical model that can predict 
the value of one sensor by taking into consideration the 
past and present values of neighboring sensors. The 
computational cost of this approach can become prohibitive 
as the number of sensors and model complexity is 
increased, but it can be done in our methodology at base 
station level (laptop class device) where all requirements 
are satisfied. 
 
Our strategy uses the analytical redundancy and relies on a 
knowledge based system (KBS) placed in base stations 
(Fig.1). The principle is the following: a malicious sensor 
node that will try to enter false information into the sensor 
network will be identified by comparing its output value x  
with the value predicted using past/present values provided 
by contiguous sensors xˆ . Taken into consideration a 
specific node denoted with A (Fig.1), this process is done 
in the following steps: 
a) Associate a trust factor b with every sensor node. In the 
beginning all non-marginal sensors have the same high 
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value of trust factor except peripheral sensors that must 
have a lower trust factor due to the fact that these sensors 
have a greater probability to be a subject of a node capture 
attack. For the specified sensor node A, we will have a 
trust factor denoted by Ab . 
b) Estimate the future value )(ˆ txA  provided by sensor 
node A, using the past/present values of adjacent sensors 
and the trust factor of each sensor; For the sensor denoted 
with A, we can write the following equation: 
)1()),(),...,1(()(ˆ ,, AadjAadjAA BntXtXftx   where 
       )2(,..., ,1,, TadjmAadjAadjA itxitxitX   is a 
vector that contains the values provided by all the m  
adjacent sensors for the sensor A at the  it  moment of 
time;    )3(,..., ,1, TadjmAadjAA bbB   is a vector that 
contains the trust factors for each m adjacent nodes for 
node A; and n  is the estimator’s order. 
c) Compare the present value )(txA  of sensor node with the 
estimated value )(ˆ txA  by computing the error 
)4()(ˆ)()( txtxte AAA  ; 
d) Increase/decrease the trust factor Ab  by using a function 
g that can be either linear or non-linear: 
     )5()1( tegtbtb AAA   
 
 
Fig. 1 : Knowledge Based System Structure – The Third Pillar of Our 
Architecture 
 
The structure of such a KBS is depicted in Fig. 1 and 
contains two important blocks: 
 Estimation and Prediction Block: this block provide the 
estimate Axˆ  following (1) equation and is able to 
memorize the past values provided by adjacent sensors 
and the related trust factors. The implementation of (1) 
can be done using conventional prediction algorithms or 
predictors based on neural networks or fuzzy logic. 
 Decision Block: here, based on a priori information 
(statistics, attack’s model), the trust factor Ab  is 
modified using (5), and, in particular circumstances, 
some alarm signals can be transmitted to a higher 
hierarchical level. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Researching security for sensor networks should be at least 
as important as self-organization, aggregation and 
communication protocols. Without security the sensor 
networks cannot be trusted and won’t have practical 
implementation in real world. The goal of our research was 
to provide security architecture to combat malicious 
attacks. This architecture is based on three pillars: one-time 
authentication done immediately after sensor deployment 
in the field, AES symmetric key encryption of all 
transmissions between sensors and base station and a KBS 
developed for prevention, detection and taken decisions in 
case of malicious attacks. 
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